Young Muslims in The Netherlands: Search for a True Islam

(AV commentaar: In de enorme tour-de-force van objectivering en deculturering van de islam, klampt de moeilijk herwonnen identiteit zich vooral vast aan symbolische mythiek, zoals het (onverdoofd) ritueel slachten, hoewel in strijd met de islamitische ethiek

Young Muslims: Search for a True Islam

By Martijn de Koning

Work in Progress – Please do not quote or attribute outside Religionresearch.org without consulting the author.

Since the murder on Van Gogh radical Muslims are the centre
of attention. However, it is still a minor group that is radicalizing. In
this lecture the focus will be on the life of ordinary, not radical and
not criminal, young Muslims and how they negotiate in different domains
(especially internet) about what Islam is, what the importance of Islam
is and how they should practice Islam. In the end some concluding
remarks will be made on the relationship between ‘radical’ and
‘moderate’ Islam.

Youth, Islam and identity

In focusing on youth we are not just looking at some age trajectory but also at identity.
The study of youth emphasizes the here and now of young people’s experience,
the social and cultural practices through which they shape their worlds
(Bucholtz 2002: 532). For young Moroccan Dutch people Islam seems to become
more important. In this paper Islam is viewed as a complete repertoire of
activities, a type of tool chest containing practices (such as prayer and
fasting, the wearing of the headscarf) and beliefs (such as halal and haram).[1]
Although, in the public debate, Islam is generally seen within a fixed and
clearly delineated context, research shows — including my work among Moroccans
in Gouda — that the reality is very different.[2] Young Muslims are confronted
with choices from different repertoires. Girls, for instance, have a choice
between wearing and not wearing a headscarf. Christians are considered either
simply as heathen, or as representatives of a ‘people of the book’ — which
calls for an entirely different approach.

This emphasis of these young people on Islam may seem strange in a secular and modern
country as the Netherlands but several authors point to the fact that it is
precisely developments such as individualization, the emphasis on autonomous
thinking and striving for self-realization that come together with modernity
that seem to generate new religious questions and different forms of
religiosity (Cesari 2003: 254, Esposito 2003: 5, Herbert 2003: 17, Roy 2003:
76-77). In the case of young Muslims also other factors may play a role.
Tennekes (1991: 13-14) points to the fact that migration makes being a Muslim
not self evident anymore but something that distinguishes people from others. A
Muslim identity is more a matter of personal choice related to the place where
people are. Another factor concerns the availability of Muslims from other
countries and therefore different Islamic repertoires. Presenting yourself as a
Muslim becomes a way to transcend these differences. The third factor he points
at is the tension that exists between the way society is experienced by young
people and how it should be according to Islam. Islam can become a project that
still has to be realised and can also become a symbol in the struggle against,
what many young people perceive as, the Western political and cultural
dominance and racism (Vertovec en Rogers 1998: 11). The combination of these
factors leads to a loss of self-evidence concerning Islam. Religion becomes an
object of debate, study and reflection or what Eickelman calls objectification
of Islam. The process by which people as three questions: What is my religion,
why is it important for my life and how does my faith lead my behaviour
(Eickelman en Piscatori 1996, Eickelman 1992: 643). Solely the fact that they
ask themselves these questions makes them involved in Islam and means that they
have to make choices from the Islamic repertoire (Roy 2003).

With this emphasis on choices we must not forget that people, whether they are
young or old, make choices within a certain social, cultural and economic
context and in relation to other people. Identity construction always occurs in
interaction with others, inside and outside their own religious, ethnic or
peer-group. Within and between these divergent groups there is a balance of
power. That is why the terms identity politics (Eriksen 1993) or Muslim
politics (Eickelman en Piscatori 1996) are useful here. Identity politics,
in my view, should be taken to mean the negotiations about the definition and
interpretation of ideas, practices and experiences that constitute a certain
identity. These are continually negotiated, implicitly and explicitly, between
people within one’s own group and with people outside this group. Distinctive
for Muslim identities or Muslim politics is the reference to experiences,
beliefs, practices, symbols, and traditions that constitute ‘Islam’ (see: Eickelman en Piscatori 1996: 20-21).[i] The concepts of identity politics and negotiations are useful here in the sense that they make clear that people make choices in relationship with other people. It makes clear that people are active agents but are also restraint by larger contexts.

Within

Within any given group we can find different and often competing conceptions on what their
identity is, what it means and how relevant it is. The politics of identity is
therefore not only based on the presence of an external other (which is most of
the times the focus of ethnic studies), but also on the process of negotiation
within a certain group (Mandaville 2001b: 106). In the case of young Muslims
their relationship with parents and significant others is very important. Young
people are not only discovering who they are, but they have to deal with people
who ‘tell’ them who they are; for example their parents and imams (Jenkins
1997: 165-166), and how they should behave accordingly.

An important feature of these negotiations with other Muslims is what Roy calls the search for authenticity and the deculturalization of religion (Roy 2003)). Young people are, as they see it,
stripping Islam from Moroccan cultural artefacts. This can be done by girls for
example by stating that when their mothers have to stay home and take care for
the children they don’t want that. They legitimize this choice by stating that
what their mother did was Moroccan tradition, not what Islam is really about.
Boys on the other hand can state that Moroccan girls these days are becoming
too Dutch, or too free. This means most of the time that these girls do not
behave in a proper modest manner towards boys. According to some boys this is
false integration and that these girls are far away from true Islam.

).

The headscarf: negotiating puberty, gender and religion

This brings up of course the issue of gender. In my opinion the most important dimension of
identity politics. Muslim girls and boys are both Muslim and boy or girl; both
components of their identity presuppose each other. Islamic beliefs of
femininity and masculinity work in daily life by means of socialization and
form the frame of reference in which man and women can develop themselves (Bartelink
1994: 206). Many beliefs concerning femininity come together in the headscarf
that works as a symbol not only for a religious identity but also for a female
identity and as part of growing up. Many girls start wearing the headscarf
because their mother, aunt, sister or niece does so. It is a means to try to
belong to the female significant others. Or when they reach the time when their
first menstruation is due; then they reach a new phase in their lives and the
headscarf can be seen as a rite of passage. In many cases in these ages, the
religious meaning comes only afterwards when people, non-muslim and muslims,
start asking questions about it from a religious frame of reference. It is also
a means for girls to state to boys that they should behave properly: to
regulate gender-relations. It is also a fashion issue. A lot of girls go to
great lengths to make sure that their headscarf is a nice and fashionable one
that fits their other clothings. It shows that these young people are actors
with a ‘multiple cultural competence’ (Vertovec en Rogers 1998: 5-10). Their
reference to the headscarf as a choice by the heart combined with the headscarf
as their own free choice, makes them connect as well with their peer group,
their parents and non-Muslims without breaking up with one of these groups.

External

When identities are formed through a process of negotiation, it is important to know
who is negotiating with whom. Young Muslims consult each other and a wide range
of authorities in their search for Islam. At the same time, the reactions of
Dutch society influence their development as a Muslim (Jenkins 1994). An
important question to ask is then: how do non-Muslims view Muslims? What
significance do people outside the Islamic tradition give to a Muslim identity
and how do Muslims view these opinions?

Most native Dutch people see Islam as a foreign element in society. This became especially
clear after 11 September 2001, during the election campaign involving Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and in the ongoing debates on integration. On these occasions, terms such as immigrants, Muslims, ethnic minorities and foreigners are used interchangeably. For Muslims themselves, 11 September marked an important turning point. One of the girls from our study in Gouda was cycling down the street the day after the event and was cursed by someone as she passed. At that moment she realised, she said, that she ‘did not belong to Dutch society’. She spoke Dutch
very well and had a job, but she felt that she was not a part of the ‘imagined
community’ (Anderson 1983) in the Netherlands. Especially the headscarf seems to
function as a signal of being a foreigner or in case of native converts as an
outsider (Van Nieuwkerk 2004).

The public reactions of politicians such as Verdonk, Van Aartsen and Wilders after the
murder of Van Gogh simply reinforced this impression. Muslim organisations were
expected to distance themselves publicly from the murder, although after the
murder of Fortuyn no such thing was expected of environmental organisations.
Many Muslims think there is a double standard being used. It confirms their
belief that they are second-class citizens.

Not all Muslims denounced the murder of Van Gogh. Many Muslims were deeply offended by
his use of terms such as ‘goat-fuckers’ and ‘the fifth column’. His collaboration
with Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali on the film Submission I, was considered as the umpteenth insult to Muslims. But there were also Moroccans that didn’t call the film an insult, primarily
people for whom Islam had little significance and older people that were not
familiar with the film. But many young people were enraged by it. It was not
the first time that Ayaan Hirsi Ali had placed Muslims in a negative light, as
though all Muslim men beat their wives on the basis of the Koran. Because this
message was expressed with a picture of a veiled, naked woman with holy
scripture written on her body, the film was doubly offensive. After the murder
of Van Gogh, a change occurred within Muslim organisations: many of them now
come forward openly to talk about the radicalisation of young people and are
trying to halt the process. But the impression that Muslims are not accepted in
the Netherlands predominates.

Virtual Arena

Internet is a new arena where negotiations are initiated into what Islam is and what being
Muslim means in a person’s daily life. Internet is more than a source of
information. It can also considered to be “spaces of communication in which the
identity, meanings and boundaries […] are continually constructed, debated and
reimagined.” (Mandaville 2001a: 169).
One of the major differences between the virtual domain of identity politics
and the other domains is that it is probably to a great extent the domain of
young people as they are far ahead of their parents, teachers and other adults
in skills and competence. This means therefore that this domain is more or less
out of sight of their parents when it comes to what they are watching. It gives
them a space of their own. As with all young people, the use of the Internet
among Moroccan-Dutch young people has expanded enormously.

Almost all websites provide space for discussion and this possibility is used to its
fullest potential. Young people take positions, which they base on the Koran,
Hadith and the statements of scholars. In this way they actually create their
own fatwas. The advantage of the Internet, of course, is that they can participate in these discussions under a pseudonym, which gives them the freedom to ask all kinds of questions. In this way, discussion forums and chat rooms provide a platform where young people can
develop a (virtual) identity.

Among the Islamic sites, the Salafi sites are clearly dominant. They seem to be regarded
by young people as having particular authority. Although all Salafi sites
appeal to the Salaf, there are differences between them. Some of them challenge
each other. Not all Salafi sites are expressly anti-Dutch or anti-Western,
although they contain much social criticism. In addition to websites, there are also online communities, the so-called MSN- or Yahoo groups, particularly WareMoslims (TrueMuslims), Moslimsdeenigeechte (Muslims the one and only) and IslamenMeer (Islam and More). At these sites the dominance of the Salafis seems to be stronger than on the websites. The MSN
groups usually have fewer permanent members than the websites, but that is not
to say they reach a smaller audience. Regularly, messages from the MSN groups
can be found on sites such as Marokko.nl. The larger groups (such as
IslamenMeer), which sometimes has a couple of thousand members, are more
moderate than the smaller groups and show a more varied picture of opinions
concerning Islam. The smaller groups are seldom granted a long life. Soon after
messages are received that inflammatory texts and threats are being exchanged,
the groups are closed down. The discussions and messages within the groups vary
widely. The subjects range from the devil to sex and from demonstrations to jihad, but the all talk about dealing with the Western world. ‘The West’ stands primarily for the US, Israel and the Jews, and the Netherlands. There are Salafi MSN groups that strongly reject Dutch society. But there are also those that seek a rapprochement and reject violence.

The Salafi MSN groups and websites work from the concepts of halal and haram. The
emphasis is different from what is stressed in discussions held between
‘normal’ young people. Haram are matters that are seen as being ‘Western’ such as demonstrations, music and similar things. The position of women is an important subject about which many different views are held. Women working outside the home is sometimes seen as a
problem by some, while others only see it as a problem if women are working in
an environment in which both sexes are present. There are Salafis that place
emphasis on the ‘jihad of the heart’, the internal struggle of the individual
to resist a range of temptations, which violate the rules of the faith. Other
Salafis support the ‘jihad of the sword’, the defensive war or holy war. They
reject the jihad of the heart because it is based on a weak tradition. Most of
the Salafi sites and MSN groups have few, if any, real discussions. They are
primarily meeting places for those of a like mind, who are primarily looking
for the ideal, the answer to how one must walk the right path.

The most important feature of the debates and questions in the larger (non-salafi) sites
is that there seems to be a lot of confusion about what is allowed (halal) and not allowed (haram) in Islam. Questions that come up among young people most of the time refer to the context of daily life in a non-Muslim society. Examples are: is it allowed to wear make up like for Dutch
girls? If I see an almost nude woman on billboards and I have sexual thoughts
about it, does this break the fastening during Ramadan? Other questions concern
how to fulfil rituals such as praying. Many boys and girls feel their parents do
not (and can not) give them enough information about these things and on the
internet they can discuss it freely among each other. On the salafi-sites we
cannot find such debates. These issues are discussed in the MSN groups and the
larger non-Salafi sites, where it is the Salafis that take the lead in
providing answers to questions. The influence of the Salafis therefore extends
beyond their own, restricted discussion groups. But how large this influence is
exactly is difficult to ascertain. The Internet is anonymous and the person
behind a pseudonym is difficult to uncover. On the one hand, their influence
seems to be large. Many young people sympathise with the Salafis because they
are ‘serious’ and consistent: they not only say what the ‘pure’ Islam is and
acknowledge its sources, they also live according to it. It is clear that
Salafis, often themselves young, know the desires and needs of young Muslims
and can provide answers to their questions.

On the other hand, their influence should not be overestimated. The statements of the
Salafis set the norm for what haram and halal is, but many young people say
that, in practice, they cannot do much with this. Many young people (and older
people) perhaps appreciate the efforts of the Salafis in approaching the faith
seriously, but on many points they do not agree with them. Their attitude
towards unbelievers and less consistent fellow Muslims is something they take
issue with. The aggressive manner in which Salafis spread their message creates
opposition and causes commotion. For many this is a reason to avoid contact
with them. Sometimes it is even a reason to refuse Salafis access to the
mosque.[ii]

It is especially in this domain where the search for a ‘true Islam’ and the
negotiations about what ‘true Islam’, is most significant. This virtual version
of ‘true Islam’ can be seen as eclectic. People are combining slogans of the
Quran and other sources into a new combination that I have called earlier
‘copy-paste Islam’ (see also: Mandaville 2001b).

Life as a test

Buitelaar (2002) makes clear from her research on virginity that choosing particular elements
from the religious repertoire and particular interpretations means neglecting
other elements and other meanings. A lot of girls in her research show that
they have mixed feelings about that because of the internalization of norms and
values of their parents. This means that negotiations about identity are not
only between people but also within a person (Østberg 2003: 164).

In this section I will look on the meaning of Islam for young people themselves and the
relationship with identity politics. For virtually every boy and girl in my
research, the fact that they are Muslim is self-evident. It is self evident for
them because, as they state it, their parents are Muslim and they are brought
up as Muslims. This seems to contradict earlier statements mentioned above that
religion in a modern context is not self-evident. This is only partly a
contradiction because what is not self-evident is the definition of being a
Muslim and the relevance of this identity in daily life.[iii]

One of the most important aspects of the religious aspect of identity is the concept of
“life as a test”. According to the boys and girls this life (in the here and
now) is just a test for the life hereafter. In order to go to heaven, instead
of the fire they have to gather enough hassaneth, points.

‘To live Islam’ is related to the conviction that this life is a test for the afterlife. You
have to prove yourself before God and that is something you have to do in this
life. At the same time however people acknowledge that mankind is fallible and
susceptive for the devil’s seduction. Certainly young people have to ‘learn’
Islam. They are considered to be naturally good or ‘tabula rasa’. Everyone has
the potential to become a ‘moemnin’ or even a ‘muhsin’; someone who has reached
perfection.[iv] Evil is thus not an inherent characteristic of man but an external temptation and people have to strive for perfection and they can become stronger when they get older in resisting the temptations of evil.

Nevertheless the concept of life as a test is very strong among all the young people. They
all consider Islam as a project that one has to accomplish (Tennekes 1991).
This is often combined with the sentence, maybe later..maybe later I will pray
or maybe later I will wear a headscarf. It is an issue for themselves and
between them and Allah as they state it. This shows again that identity
negotiation not only takes place between people but also within people. People
reflect on their thoughts and decisions with themselves: do I act in accordance
with my conscience, how to balance my beliefs and practices with life in Dutch
society and with my parents’ wishes or God’s will (Østberg 2003: 164)?

Most of the time of course, this is part of their negotiations with other people. This becomes
very clear when we look at their dealings with the concepts of halal and haram. Moroccan boys and girls grow up with the concepts of halal and haram from a very early age. The term haram, in particular, is often used. The young people that took part in our study in Gouda had no problem naming examples of this: lying, sex before marriage, drinking alcohol, eating pork, etc. But most
of them could only name two or three examples of halal. The concepts of halal
and haram are most often used in connection with food, clothing and male-female relationships, and in order to judge one another’s conduct. These are not objective categories, but rather
religious-cultural concepts that young people use to demarcate their
environment and to form their identity. Almost all questions young people pose
about Islam are stated in reference to these terms. Is it haram to eat at the home of non-Muslim friends? Is the wearing of make-up, like Dutch girls do, permitted? Is it haram to work as a student intern in a restaurant where alcohol and pork are served? Is it permissible for a girl to take her headscarf off at school if wearing it is not permitted there? These are the questions that imams
or others, who in the eyes of the young people are authorities on Islam, are
repeatedly asked. They usually pertain to everyday life in the Netherlands and often imply a comparison with the (reputed) practices of native Dutch, non-Muslim young people.

Halal and haram are not only categories of norms and concepts that are used to form a
personal identity, they are also concepts used to negotiate through discussions. This becomes clear in the answer an imam in Gouda gave to the question of ‘am I obliged to wear a headscarf?’ A girl that attended a school where the wearing of the headscarf was not permitted at the time asked the question.[v] His answer to her question was: “Yes, it is required.” The imam had
no knowledge of the girl’s situation, but a number of adult women who were
present at the time were aware of the situation. So they then asked him the
question: “But what should you do if it is prohibited?” He answered

“You should wear it regardless, because it
is prescribed”.

“But what if this means that you have to
leave school?”

“Then you should fight for the right to
wear it!”

“What if the school continues enforcing
the ban regardless?”

“Then you should talk with the school
authorities.”

After about ten minutes of this, the last
answer the imam gave was:

“When you go to school, you should wear
the headscarf. Once you enter the building, remove it. When you return home,
put the headscarf back on.”

This was exactly what all girls that wore a headscarf to school were doing every day.
The women that continued asking for clarification had in fact been looking for
this answer, they later said. Although the norm was clearly stated, the girls
were allowed, with the consent of the imam, to obey the school regulations.
This was important for them to hear, because they felt guilty every time they
removed the headscarf and every time they put it back on. Other Muslims brought
this up for discussion: “That is playing around with your religion, which
you shouldn’t be. It is haram.” But because of the statement of the imam, the girls received legitimacy for the solution they had come up with themselves. As was the case in the imam-conflict mentioned above, young boys and girls seem to opt for a stricter version of
Islam. Still, many boys and girls themselves chose not to obey these statements:
“What I do privately is my business. It is between me and Allah.”
This combination of an either-or attitude with individuality and selectivity
when it comes to what elements of Islam to follow up is typical for youth in
general (Østberg 2003). This is also approved of by older people who state that
the young people are still in a learning phase so they don’t have to do
everything perfectly. This either-or mentality of young people can have several
reasons. They have to make choices out of different repertoires, youth culture,
Islam, their parents’ culture, Dutch cultures. This may cause people to look
for a solid foundation, as it were, a cohesive view of society, a ‘yearning for
wholeness’ (see also: Borgman et al. 2003), for meaning. An either-or mentality makes it probably easier to bring some coherence in their identity[vi] because it provides them with
easier choices. Another reason might be the fact that young people have to
answer themselves towards others: Muslims and non-Muslims. The boys and girls
in my research have the distinct impression that this requires giving clear-cut
answers: yes or no, especially towards non-Muslims. Halal and haram provides
them with a stronger identity because it more clearly demarcates the boundaries
between them and the older Moroccans who do not practise true Islam and between
them and non-Muslims.

Researcher

Being non-Muslim was only an important issue during internal conflicts. During those
internal conflicts when my identity played a role, it played a role because the
meaning of my native Dutch and non-muslimidentity had changed. The negative
attitude in the media towards Muslims, made a lot of people wonder how the
Dutch really thought of them. When you are against non-Muslims in the mosque
you certainly don’t want non-Muslims in the mosque with a negative attitude
towards you and your beliefs. I think indeed that this was not personal but
that our (the Dutch homework volunteers and me) presence was foremost a symbol.
A symbol is not just a thing that stands for something else, but it also
generates meaning (Cohen 1985). It is important to bear in mind that the
presence of non-Muslims in the mosque has always been an issue and that it can
be seen as symbolic issues of struggle. Social problems are usually symbolic
problems: ‘circumstances that, in a figurative sense, clash with important
values and norms in a society’ (Gerritsen en De Vries 1994: 13). In a symbolic
way our presence is violating several norms and values that are considered to
be important in a society (see also: Bartels 2000). We standing for the Dutch
community meant several things for different people. For some it meant the
presence of the negative attitude, for others it meant (especially working with
the Moroccan girls) that we stand for the Dutch freedom which in the eyes of
several parents and children goes too far and for some it meant that we were
kafirs and that we violated the rules of ritual purity. Another aspect that
could be important is that Islam has come to be a political issue and that
therefore our presence brought politics into mosque: something a lot of Moroccans don’t
want (source ****).

Although the latter probably also accounts for the boys and girls of my research group
their view was slightly different. They never considered me to be too old and
probably the nickname of Dutch Berber was ridiculous in their eyes. They
considered me to be a Dutch young man, non-Muslim, who was not hostile towards
them. When I once send a boy home for being impolite towards one of the
visitors of the mosque, he told me I was racist. The rest of the boys were
angry or just laughed and one of them said: “Hello, how can he be a racist? He
works here for several years now, in a mosque with only Moroccan children? How
can he be a racist?” They considered me to be a non-Muslim, sometimes kafir.
When that happened it was always when they asked me why I still was not a Muslim.
Some of them changed the meaning of kafir in talks with me so that I would not
fall into that category. In working with the girls I even think that it worked
positive for the research that I was considered to be a non-Muslim because I
could talk with them about issues like sexuality, boys and relationships, something
that would be impossible for a Muslim man to do according to my male and female
Muslim colleagues at the Woonhuis Foundation. Nevertheless, I only raised these
issues with girls whom I knew for a longer period of time (two years).

The categorization by the researched has several implications for doing research.
First of all it means that you never are the neutral person that you are trying
to be in the eyes of the people. A second implication can be that the access to
the group or parts of it, can be influenced. As a male researcher it could be
more difficult to come into contact with girls and women. As a non-Muslim the
access to the prayer or other rituals can be hindered and people can try to
convert you. Another implication is that the categorization can play a role in
internal processes. These implications do not only influence the fieldwork and
the information that can be gathered but can also be sources of new
information.

Conclusion

Although for most young people being a Muslim is self-evident, being a Muslim in the Netherlands, the definition and the significance of this identity is not. Islam becomes a
topic for reflection, study and debate. Their Muslim identity is a continuing
negotiation between them and their parents, peers, non-Muslims and within them.
The Muslim identity of Moroccan-Dutch young people is based on looking for the
‘true’ Islam. This search for a true Islam should not be interpreted as an
identity crisis per se. People always develop their identity during their lives
and most of the time this search is always continuing. For young Muslims, in
this search choices have to be made from a range of interpretations concerning
the Islamic faith through negotiations about the definition of the religion
that are conducted with peers, parents, imams, non-Muslims and with themselves.
The ‘true’ Islam that many young people seek is separate from the Moroccan
traditions of their parents and provides them with ways to be Muslim in the Netherlands.
The concepts of halal and haram, the either-or attitude of many
young people, also play an important role in this search. It makes choosing
simpler and provides them with a stronger identity. It also provides them with
a means to break away from their parents’ traditions. This does not mean a break
with their parents as well or a break with Dutch society. With questions about
‘true Islam’ that are connected with daily life in the Netherlands,
they are instrumentalizing Islam as a bridge between their parents and Dutch
society and as a source of inspiration for becoming a full citizen of this
society. Roy’s view on phrase on ‘deculturalization of islam’ and separating religion from
culture as one of the key characteristics of modern day young Muslims, might
therefore not be appropriate because it suggests that they are in some kind of
cultural vacuum. It also suggest, although I don’t think he means it like this,
that religion and culture are two clearly definable and distinguishable
entities. This is not the case. With the instrumentalization of Islam and their
search for a true Islam young people do not enter into a cultural no-mans land
but through their process of negotiating identities and religion they are
creating a new framework of meaning and (to refer to Hobsbawn words) inventing
their own traditions. In this process of identity politics their loyalties
towards other Muslims, their parents and non-Muslims are not broken but they
are re-arranged and re-defined.

When people search for a ‘true Islam’ one might expect that they have a clear goal: becoming a perfect Muslim. This might be the case for some people but most of them also recognize that this is virtually impossible. Trying to become a good Muslim and struggling against the
temptations of every day life is essential for being a Muslim, not doing everything
perfect. This stance is acknowledged by both young people and older people; especially
young people have to learn Islam and don’t have to do everything right. This
leaves room for the individual negotiations of every boy and girl.

But the search for the ‘true’ Islam is not conducted without a struggle and perhaps this plays a role in the discourse of ‘being in between cultures’ or ‘stripping Islam from Moroccan traditions’. This
discourse shows that young people sometimes feel stressed in a situation where
their identity politics are frustrated. On one side Moroccan religious organisations
are not always willing to meet the desires and needs of these young people. On
the other side many young Muslims feel that non-Muslims exclude Islam as a
foreign religion. As a result, many Moroccan-Dutch young people feel that they
are not accepted as Muslims. With the help of Islam, they try to navigate a
path between two worlds. They do not feel at home in mosque organisations and
national umbrella organisations. At the same time, they are alienated from the
non-Muslim Dutch population. This is perhaps where the Salafis enter the
arena’s of identity politics. The different salafi-groups, ranging from an
emphasis on dialogue and da’wah to fierce anti-western thoughts, offer them a
perspective, from which complex and contradictory knowledge suddenly assume a
shape and an environment in which they do feel welcome and in which they can
fulfil their needs and desires.

References

Anderson,
B. 1983. Imagined Communities, 2nd
edition 1991 edition. New York: Verso Press.

Bartelink, Y. 1994. Vrouwen
over Islam. Geloofsvoorstellingen en -praktijken van Marokkaanse migrantes in
Nederland (Brabant). Nijmegen: Katholieke Universiteit (proefschrift
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[i] Eickelman and Piscatori (1996) make
no mention of experiences in their definition. Most of the time this concept is
left out of the concept of identities and identity politics. Eriksen (1993),
Bentley (1987, 1991) and Yelvington (1991) point out, in different ways, why
identity is more than just an instrument for the realization of ones interests
and that experiences are an important base for the emerging of identities.

[ii] These groups are driven into
isolation. Partly because they want to isolate themselves and because of the
way they operate, but also because of reactions of fellow Muslims.

[iii] See for a discussion about
individual choice in the context of secularisation and the issue of the
either-or attitude also discussed here: Fadil (2003).

[iv] Muslims are people who (try) to
follow god’s word. ‘Moemnin’ are those who have ‘imaan’ a strong belief. Muhsin
are those who have ihsan. When people have reached ihsan, they do everything
the best way possible and are always conscious of their responsibilities
towards God. Everything they do or don’t is in remembrance of God.

[v]
Er was niet alleen een verbod op hoofddoeken, ook petjes waren niet toegestaan.
Inmiddels is het verbod niet
meer van kracht.

[vi] Psychological research (involving
people choosing different jam products) on making choices suggests too many
choices actually lead to less happiness, a lower sense of control, and even
paralysis. One strategy to overcome this is choosing less and limiting your
options. See the following review of several ‘choice-studies’:
http://www.newyorker.com/critics/books/?040301crbo_books

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