The Dynamics of the Crisis in Syria (refuting deliberate lies by the media)

The Dynamics of the Crisis in Syria. Conflict Versus Conflict Resolution. (Part 1)
– Dr. Christof Lehmann. – After 19 months of violent conflict in Syria a feasible solution seems farther removed than ever. The influx of fundamentalist Salafist or Wahabist fighters which have been streaming to Syria since the failure of two major Free Syrian Army assaults on Aleppo in June and July 2012 made it increasingly difficult to build a coherent and credible Syrian political and military opposition among the proponents of regime-change. The international anti Syrian alliance has difficulties in identifying a political or military opposition that could be used as an argument for regime change. The Turkish-Syrian conflict risks to spiral out of control with potentially catastrophic consequences for Syria, Turkey, Lebanon and the region. After the violence has begun spreading into Turkey and Lebanon, increasing the risk of a regional war with potentially global bearing, the containment of the crisis is becoming increasingly difficult. The international community is as divided as the Syrian opposition. The pressure is on all sides to resolve the crisis. Opinions about how to solve the crisis differ widely. The article offers the necessary analysis, suggests possible solutions and the potential consequences of a protracted and widening conflict.
The Political and Military Spectrum of the Syria Discourse.
The primary precondition for resolving the crisis in Syria implicit its national, international and regional dynamics is the understanding of the constituents of the political and military discourse. That is, the current Syrian government and a peaceful domestic political opposition, the predominantly foreign backed political and militant opposition, the international backers of the pro-regime-change opposition, the United Nations, the Arab League, and the dynamics of their interplay with one another.
The National Council of Syria. (NCS)
The NCS was constituted by several hundred Syrian nationals who predominantly belong to the Syrian expatriate community. Due to claims of anonymous members its actual strength could never be verified. The NCS was formed in Ankara, Turkey, with the support of the Turkish AKP government of Prime Minister R. Tayyip Erdogan.
An investigation into the background of the known members published in an article that was written shortly after the NCS was constituted in 2011 indicated a strong foreign influence. According to this investigation the majority of the NCS´s founding members had close ties to the National Endowment for Democracy, Reagan Fascell Fellowships, and other organizations that indicated a strong influence of US American intelligence services and political lobbies with ties to Henry Kissinger and Associates and the security adviser to several US Administrations, Zbigniev Brzezinski. 1
The NCS intended to constitute itself as representative for all opposition movements, including Muslim Brothers, Kurdish factions, the secular left and right, intellectuals and dissidents. Already during the official constitution in Ankara in 2011 it was plagued by strong ideological divisions. Even though, on the day it was constituted it demanded to be recognized as the sole representative of the people of the Syrian Arab Republic and as government de jure. It is today almost exclusively representative of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. According to evaluations by the Danish Middle East Specialist Erik Mohn, the NCS has lost most of its support from Turkey´s AKP government and other western governments who began focusing their support on the Free Syrian Army (FSA) after the NCS failed to constitute itself as the political leadership of the armed opposition and as an organization that could represent a united political opposition. The influence and the activity level of the NCS are today very low. The latest blog entry on its official website dates back to 9. Maj 2012. 2.
The Revolutionary Council of Syria (RCS)
The Revolutionary Council of Syria, RCS, is an offshoot of the National Council of Syria NCS. The RCS was constituted in August 2012 in Egypt and it is led by its founder, the Syrian dissident Haitham al Maleh. Al Maleh claimed to have seventy high profile members of the opposition against the Baath Party Government of President Bashar Al-Assad behind him, but these claims have not been substantiated.
The RCS is by many perceived as a symptom of a lack of convergence between the interests of Turkey´s AKP government of P.M. R. Tayyip Erdogan and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood led government of Egypt´s President Mursi. While RCS leader al-Maleh is making claims that he is working pragmatically and on the basis, he is based in Egypt, which leads many FSA commanders to also describe him as an opportunist. The political activity level and influence of the RCS is very limited.
The Free Syrian Army. (FSA)
The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was constituted by deserted officers and troops of the Syrian military during the summer of 2011. Its official commander is Colonel Rias al-Assad, but the FSA failed to establish an actual central or general command structure. The FSA initially claimed that its function was to protect peaceful protesters from the military forces of the Syrian government. In a number of well documented cases however, members of the FSA attacked peaceful protesters, blaming the shooting on the regular Syrian military. Some of these crimes have been committed in collusion with journalists from Al-Jazeera and led to the expulsions of Al-Jazeera journalists from Syria.
Although the FSA remained unsuccessful in recruiting a significant number of deserters from the Syrian military forces, it succeeded in recruiting a large number of Syrian, Turkish, Egyptian and Qatari Muslim Brothers. By early June 2012, prior to the two major campaigns to secure Aleppo, the FSA had no more than 3.000 Syrian core members, but it had been significantly reinforced by members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and major contingents of other foreign fighters. Its total strength in early June 2012 was estimated at approximately 70.000 troops plus a yet unknown number of Turkish, US American, British, Qatari and Saudi Special Forces.
Recruitment of foreign fighters was and is still organized through refugee camps in Turkey. The Workers´Party of Turkey has filed criminal charges against the AKP government of R. Tayyip Erdogan. 3. Prior to June the Military Intelligence Service of Turkey was also reported to have an intelligence room and recruitment office on Mekkha Street in the city of Amman, Jordan.4.
Failure to establish a general command structure resulted in the establishment of regional warlords who fought for the control of smaller villages or districts of major cities like Aleppo, Idlib, Homs and villages at the outskirts of Damascus. The failure to establish a general command and a high number of untrained and undisciplined volunteers are most likely the primary causes for many of the massacres, pillaging, summary executions that have been documented since the establishment of the FSA. The influx of Salafist fighters from the Al-Qaeda associated Libyan Islamic Fighting Group has most likely aggravated the uncontrolled violence. Furthermore, the fact that many leading commanders of the FSA disputed the political role of the National Council of Syria, calling them opportunists, and the fact that the Free Syrian Army was struggling with local warlords political disputes weakened the political and military credibility and strength of both the NCS and the FSA.
The Defeat of the Free Syrian Army in June and July.
In June and July two major military campaigns of the FSA failed to emulate the strategy that had been successfully applied in Libya. To secure Aleppo as a military stronghold and seat of a transitional government which could quasi legitimately call on allied nations to assist with the implementation of a “No-Fly-Zone” or a military intervention.
Within this context it is noteworthy that the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, Ivo H. Daalder, and NATO`s Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander of the U.S. European Command James G. Stavridis; published an article in the March-April issue of Foreign Affairs, in which they called NATO´s Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011 a “teachable moment and a model for future interventions“.5 The article and its consequences with regards to modern NATO military doctrine, international law and Syria have been analyzed in a previous article by the author. 6 The NATO model for future interventions failed in Syria with the failure of the FSA to secure Aleppo as the seat for a transitional government.
Lack of coordination in the campaign against Aleppo has devastating consequences for the FSA who suffered significant and in fact decisive losses in Aleppo, after which the Syrian military could begin focusing on fighting down the isolated warlords in Homs, Idlib, and at the outskirts of Damascus. After the defeat and heavy casualties many Syrian as well as foreign volunteers gave up the fight. In fact many were seeking to realign themselves with the Syrian government after witnessing the massive war crimes and human rights abuses that had been committed by FSA fighters and in particular by the foreign reinforcements.
The FSA was heavily criticized by human rights organizations. Even Human Rights Watch, which is widely criticized for selective monitoring and reporting of war crimes and human rights abuses in Libya and Syria has sharply criticized the FSA.
The Salafist – Wahabist Fighters in Syria
After the defeat of the FSA in June – July 2012 the military offensive to topple the government de jure of Syria would have stagnated, and most likely a peaceful resolution to the conflict would have been achieved, had it not been for a significant influx of fighters from a cohort of predominantly Saudi Arabia and Qatar backed Salafist or Wahabist organizations. Many of these organizations have direct or indirect ties to both Al-Qaeda and the Afghani and Pakistani Taliban. Details about many of these organization’s contributions to the conflict are detailed in the report, Tentative Jihad: Syria’s Fundamentalist Opposition, which was issued by the International Crisis Group on 12. October 2012. 7
What the report of the International Crisis Group, which is funded by the self-proclaimed philanthropist, philosopher and multi billionaire George Soros fails to elicit is, that the majority of the funding, training and arming of these groups is provided by Saudi Arabia.
Already in September 2011 the article Syria NATO and the Modified Chechnyan Model revealed that Russian and Syrian intelligence services had intercepted communications that indicated that Al Qaeda´s Omar Brigade, which is financed by Saudi Arabia and under the supervision of the Saudi Ministry of the Interior had been deployed to Syria. 8
Wahabi, or Salafi organizations represent a convergence of German Word War II Fascism and a totalitarian and radical interpretation of Islam under the protectorate of the Royal Family of Saudi Arabia.
While Salafist extremists have been present and active since the onset of the conflict, the significant influx after July 2012 has also significantly changed the military and political landscape. The fact that the FSA never had established a coherent command structure into which the influx of Jihadis could be integrated worsened the incoherence of the armed opposition. The fact of the matter is that the armed opposition has degenerated into a cohort of small units, many of which claim their particular turf as liberated Caliphate. Many of them are laying claim on political power in their micro enclaves or in post-subversion Syria.
The subsequent and drastic increase in summary executions, beheadings, and anarchy under the banner of a perverted form of Sharia has in fact been extremely counter productive for the opposition at large.
Fearing that their country is being overrun by Salafist extremists, imported from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, as well as France, the UK, and other European countries, many Syrians are giving up the armed struggle. Others are realigning themselves with the Syrian military and the government de jure of the Syrian Arab Republic. On 28 September the prominent FSA commander Captain Khaled Abdel Rahman al-Zamel, accompanied by ten other FSA officers, took part in a conference of the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change, NCC, which is seeking a Syrian solution to the crisis and which is tolerant of the Baath Party and President al-Assad.
The article Washington´s Salafist Quagmire in Syria describes how the development is not only weakening the military opposition and making it increasingly difficult to unite a credible, functional and presentable political opposition, it is also developing into a public relations problem for the the US Administration and other proponents of regime change. 9
The Kurdish Minorities in Syria.
Both the Turkish Kurds represented by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the PKK affiliated Syrian Democratic Union Party, which has a strong political influence in the predominantly ethnic Kurdish regions of Syria are determined to prevent the spreading of the bloodshed and massacres committed by the FSA and Salafist extremists to the Kurdish areas. The Democratic Union Party and the PKK yield a sufficiently strong influence to resist the FSA and the affiliated Salafist militia. As in other parts of Syria there are small pockets of FSA and Salafist fighters in the Kurdish regions, and there are incidents related to arms and troops trafficking via the Syrian border. However, the Kurdish Fractions and the Syrian military are keeping the region relatively calm.
Some western media, first and foremost the government controlled TV stations, are making unsubstantiated claims that the Kurdish populations and the parties are eager to cooperate with the subversion and that they are looking forward to Kurdish liberation after the fall of the Damascus government. These reports have to be assessed as predominantly based on propaganda rather than actuality. Both appeals by the Turkish government and the FSA, most prominently by FSA Commander Mustafa al-Sheikh to Kurdish Parties and Fractions to join the insurgency have failed.
In June 2011, at the onset of the FSA campaign for Aleppo, a senior member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria, Nuri Brimo, expressed that the Kurdish National Council, KNC, has decided not to get involved in the insurgency against the Syrian government and military and that the council has decided to keep the Kurdish areas peaceful.
Nuri Brimo said, that the KNC does not want events like the massacres in Daraa and Homs to be repeated in predominantly ethnically Kurdish cities. Brimo added that one day things may get out of control, but so far security and calm have prevailed.
At the beginning of June 2011 the Kurdish areas witnessed some violence between the Kurdish National Council and the PYD. The clashes ceased after an agreement between the KNC and PYD was signed on 11 June. The clashes between the PYD and the KNC occurred due to insecurity about a possible security gap that could arise if the attempted subversion should succeed in defeating the Syrian Military.
Both the KNC and the PYD have recognized that their primary strategic partner for security is the Syrian government, the Syrian military and thereafter other Kurdish factions. 10
Contrary to the Kurdish population of Turkey which is suffering from considerable oppression, the Syrian Kurdish minority enjoys considerable rights and privileges. The constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic enshrines considerable rights and privileges for ethnic and religious minorities. It also guarantees equal rights an opportunity to women. The Kurds of Syria are acutely aware of the fact that it is very unlikely that any new Syrian government that has come to power with the political and military support of a Turkish government, and in particular the AKP led government of P.M. Erdogan is likely not to improve the situation.
Beside that, neither the NCS, the FSA, or the Salafist mercenaries have any political program that would guarantee the Kurdish minority of Syria the same rights and privileges as they already have, and even if any of these opposition groups had a program that guaranteed the rights of the Kurdish minority, none of them have either the military nor the political credibility to make them a suitable and reliable partner for the Kurds of Syria.
The National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCC)
The National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change, NCC, is a pro-reform organization that is based in Damascus. It is a broad popular coalition of Pan-Arabists, Nationalists, Kurdish Parties and Organizations, Syrian Socialists, Internationalist Socialists, Marxist Organizations, Peace Movements, Human Rights Organizations, Religious NGOs and other organizations. It is by far the largest and most inclusive pro-reform organization. Although it is by far the largest and most representative pro-reform organization, its initiatives have been largely ignored by Western and Gulf Arab mainstream politicians and media.
Opposite to all of the foreign-backed opposition the NCC and all of its constituent parties and organizations reject unsolicited foreign interference into the internal affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic. The NCC opposes any foreign military intervention and vehemently opposes the foreign backed insurgency on the grounds of international law and on the grounds that it is counterproductive to the ongoing reform process in Syria. The NCC perceives the militant, foreign backed insurgency in Syria as the main obstacle to genuine and comprehensive reforms in Syria.
The NCC criticizes the economic sanctions against Syria as misguided. Economic sanctions, so the NCC, are predominantly inflicting suffering and harm on the general population. The NCC perceives the diplomatic sanctions against Syria as counterproductive to genuine dialog and conflict resolution. The NCC recognizes the Syrian Arab Baath Party as partner toward genuine and comprehensive national reforms as well as a political competition and partner within a democratic discourse.
The NCC is regularly organizing conferences which rather than focusing on the discourse of a particular party organize the necessary systemic, institutional and cultural instruments that are necessary for a genuine democratic discourse.
Members of the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change are being systematically targeted by the Free Syrian Army and Salafist terrorist organizations in an attempt to disrupt the political dialog and reform process.
The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SNP).
The Syrian Social Nationalist Party , SNP, was constituted in 1932 in Beirut as a party for national independence from French colonialism and for social justice. It is working on a socialist democratic platform comparable to that of the Social Democratic Parties in Germany and Denmark, or the British Labour Party. The program of the SNP endorses Syrian national sovereignty and independence within the framework of a political and economic Pan-Arabic union.
The SNP opposes unsolicited foreign intervention into the domestic political affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic. It sharply criticizes foreign political and material support of insurgents on the grounds of international law, and on the grounds that the foreign backed subversion and the wave of terrorism it has brought to Syria is counter-productive to genuine political, economic and social reforms.
The SNP has taken part in the 2012 elections and it is represented in the Syrian Parliament and part of the current coalition government that is constituted by The Syrian Socialist Arab Baath Party, The Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and The Peoples Will Party. After the 2012 elections the prominent SNP member Dr. Ali Haidar became Minister of State for National Reconciliation Affairs of the government of President Bashar Al-Assad.
As well as members of all other reformist movements and parties who reject foreign intervention and and armed subversion, members of the SNP are being systematically targeted and assassinated by the FSA and Salafist terrorist organizations.
The Peoples Will Party (PWP).
The Peoples Will Party has a social and liberal democratic platform. It has taken part in the 2012 elections and is represented in the Syrian Parliament. After the elections the prominent PWP member Dr. Qadri Jamil became the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs and the Minister of Internal Trade and Consumer Protection. Dr. Jamil is also the chairman of the Popular Front for Change and Liberation, which is part of the largest pro-reform organization, the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change, NCC.
Also the PWP rejects unsolicited foreign political and military interference into the internal affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic on the ground of international law and because of their adverse effect on the ongoing political, legal and social reforms in Syria.
The Syrian Socialist Arab Baath Party ( Baath Party).
The Syrian Socialist Arab Baath Party constitutes iteself on the basis of Pan-Arabic Socialism, that is, governance based on secular, socialist principles, with the endorsement of religious freedom and protection of religious and ethnic minorities. The Baath Party is the greatest Syrian Party. Although it has been criticized for holding on to governance under emergency laws too long, thus stalling a much wanted and much needed development of political competition and reforms, both the Party and President Al-Assad enjoy very high approval ratings.
In early 2012 the Baath Party succeeded in spite of the ongoing subversion to implement comprehensive political reforms. Four political parties have been approved, registered. Elections have been held. The elections were free, open, fair and in spite of the threat of terrorism peaceful.
The Baath Party is currently forming a coalition government with the participation of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and the Peoples Will Party. In early 2012 the pre-2012 elections government has drafted a new Syrian constitution that has been approved by 89 % in a referendum. In spite of the ongoing violence and threats against polling stations, over 69 % of the electorate voted in the referendum,
The Syrian Arab Baath Party has practiced considerable self-critique, most prominently from the side of President Al-Assad. Primarily this self-critique is based on having been too slow to implement political reforms and for holding on to governance under emergency laws for too long.
The Baath Party encourages all peaceful and constructive political opposition and national reconciliation. It rejects any unsolicited political and military intervention on the grounds of international law and on the grounds that they are counter-productive to genuine political, legal and social reforms.
Other Parties and Organizations.
Since the onset of the Arab Spring in Syria in March 2011, the Syrian government has implemented the dual policy of maintaining security and fighting the armed subversion, while embracing and promoting an inclusive, peaceful political discourse. Several amnesties for citizens who had taken up arms and who had not been directly involved in outright murder and crimes against humanity, while encouraging the establishment of new political parties and organizations have contributed to the success of this policy.
Other organizations which are not explicitly accounted for in this analysis include a Youth Party, The Communist Party of Syria, and a cohort of smaller parties and grassroots organizations which have sprung up in Syria since 2011. Many of these parties and organizations are taking part in the work and conferences of the National Coordinating Committe for Democratic Change, NCC. Provided that the armed subversion can be contained, there is today a solid potential for genuine reform and a genuine democratic discourse in Syria.
 
The Apologetic Discourse.
(Part 2)(Part3)
Dr. Christof Lehmann is a psychologist, independent political adviser and consultant with 30 years experience on highest levels of international politics, geo-politics, conflict and conflict resolution. He is a lifelong advocate for human rights, peace and international justice. Christof Lehmann is a frequent contributor of articles to printed and online media and is the owner of the blog nsnbc – no spin news. He can be contacted at [email protected] .
Notes:
1) Christof Lehmann, (2011) The National Council of Syria and US Unconventional Warfare , accessed on 22.10.2012 at http://nsnbc.wordpress.com/2011/10/06/the-national-counsel-of-syria-and-u-s-unconventional-warfare/
2) Official Website of the NCS, accessed on 21.10.2012. http://www.syriancouncil.org/en/latest-blog-posts.html
3 WORKERS’ PARTY (TURKEY) FILED A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT ABOUT THE TERROR CAMPS IN HATAY! Workers Party – Turkey, article accessed on nsnbc on 22.10.2012 at http://nsnbc.wordpress.com/2012/09/14/workers-party-turkey-filed-a-criminal-complaint-about-the-terror-camps-in-hatay/
4) Christof Lehmann (2012) Attack on Syria likely before March ? Accessed on nsnbc 22.10.2012 at http://nsnbc.wordpress.com/2012/02/17/attack-on-syria-likely-before-march/
5) Ivo H. Daalder, James G. Stavridis (2012). NATO`s Victory in Libya. The Right Way to Run an Intervention. Foreign Affairs. March/April 2012. Pp.2 – 7.
6) Christof Lehmann (2012)  NATO`s 25th Summit in Chicago in Preparation of Global Full Spectrum Dominance, Interventionism, Possible Preparations for A Regional War Directed against Russia and China, and Developments in Global Security. Accessed on nsnbc on 22.10.2012 http://nsnbc.wordpress.com/2012/05/20/natos-25th-summit-in-chicago-in-preparation-of-global-full-spectrum-dominance-interventionism-possible-preparations-for-a-regional-war-directed-against-russia-and-china-and-developments-in-global/
7) International Crisis Group.(2012)  Tentative Jihad: Syria´s Fundamentalist Opposition. Accessed on the website of the International Crisis Group on 22.10.2012 at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2012/mena/syria-tentative-jihad-syria-s-fundamentalist-opposition.aspx
8) Christof Lehmann (2011) Syria, NATO and the Modified Chechnyan Model, accessed at nsnbc on 22.10.2012 at http://nsnbc.wordpress.com/2011/09/25/syria-nato-and-the-modified-chechnyan-model/
9) Christof Lehmann (2012) Washington’s Salafist Quagmire in Syria, accessed at nsnbc on 22.10.2012 at http://nsnbc.wordpress.com/2012/10/14/washingtons-salafist-quagmire-in-syria/
10) Christof Lehmann (2012. Kurdish Fractions Fight NATO-led Free Syrian Army. Accessed on nsnbc on 22.10.2012, at http://nsnbc.wordpress.com/2012/06/29/kurdish-fractions-fights-nato-led-free-syrian-army/

The Dynamics of the Crisis in Syria. Conflict Versus Conflict Resolution. (Part 2)
Dr. Christof Lehmann. – After 19 months of violent conflict in Syria a feasible solution seems farther removed than ever. The influx of fundamentalist Salafist or Wahabist fighters which have been streaming to Syria since the failure of two major Free Syrian Army assaults on Aleppo in June and July 2012 made it increasingly difficult to build a coherent and credible Syrian political and military opposition among the proponents of regime-change. The international anti Syrian alliance has difficulties in identifying a political or military opposition that could be used as an argument for regime change. The Turkish-Syrian conflict risks to spiral out of control with potentially catastrophic consequences for Syria, Turkey, Lebanon and the region. After the violence has begun spreading into Turkey and Lebanon, increasing the risk of a regional war with potentially global bearing, the containment of the crisis is becoming increasingly difficult. The international community is as divided as the Syrian opposition. The pressure is on all sides to resolve the crisis. Opinions about how to solve the crisis differ widely. The article offers the necessary analysis, suggests possible solutions and the potential consequences of a protracted and widening conflict.
The Apologetic Discourse.
The majority of the Syrian population, including members of the Baath Party, the NCC, the PWP, and other reformist organizations are aware of that the Baath Party has been too slow to lift emergency laws and too slow at initiating reforms. There is however, also a broad consensus among the non-foreign backed political organizations, that Syria has had to cope with serious threats to its national security, and that reforms cannot be implemented at the cost of neglecting these concerns.
The general consensus within this apologetic discourse is that Syria, beside the armed insurgency, has been and is confronted with the following threats to its national security and integrity.
Israel´s occupation of the Syrian Golan Highs and plans for a permanent annexation of the Golan by Israel; Syria´s support of Palestine against the illegal occupation by Israel and security concerns that arise due to this policy; the lack of convergence in the energy needs of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Russia versus thos of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the USA and key members of the European Union; the position of Syria as the sole remaining ally to Russia in the Middle East, Syria´s role as a stabilizing factor in Lebanon and related security concerns; the threat of religious or ethnic fanaticism and ethnic or religious violence that threatens to undermine the protection of ethnic and religious minorities as well as equal opportunity which is enshrined in the Syrian constitution.
The general consensus among all of the parties and organizations who are participating in the peaceful political discourse in Syria, including the Baath Party, is that the attempted armed subversion is increasing all of these threats to Syria´s national security, and that it is counterproductive to the development of genuine participatory democratic institutions and processes.
The Manufacturing of Consent with the Interventionist Discourse .
Media reports about the crisis differ considerably, are often heavily biased, and reflect a deterioration in regional and global security that is reminiscent of the cold war. The inherent risk in the deterioration of relative objectivity of the media with regards to Syria is that the majority of political decision makers is predominantly receiving information through the same media as the general population, thus poising them to making decisions based on propaganda, rather than on aspects of international law, facts, and accurate analysis.
During a briefing of several groups of European parliamentarians on the situation in Libya and Syria by the author in early 2012 it transpired that the majority of the members of European parliaments received the information about the Middle East, on which they base their decisions, predominantly from either mainstream media or from reports issued by think tanks which are strongly biased. A small group of parliamentarians who are members of relevant select committees, who receive reports from their countries foreign intelligence services stated that the information that is provided to them through these channels also normally is strongly filtered and biased. The potential legal and political and security implication with regards to the Syria crisis, which is the potential of spiraling into a regional war with global implications inherently dangerous.
The following examples elicit the problem the biased media reports pose for political decision making processes.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (OHR).
Behind the official sounding name Syrian Observatory for Human Rights are two London based bureaus. The OHR was constituted in early 2011 by a small group of London based Syrian expatriates and issued regular reports about the number of arrests and casualties. In almost all of the reports issued by the OHR the casualty figures, and especially the casualty figures attributed to the Syrian police and military forces were significantly higher than the reports that were issued by the Syrian government, the United Nations, and Syria based pro-democracy, anti-regime-change organizations.
Although the Syrian government regularly issues detailed and well documented reports which are far more consistent with those issued by the United Nations, the majority of western mainstream media, including the Qatar State TV channel Al-Jazeera, BBC, CNN, etc. consistently and disregarding the questionable methodology, used the statistics provided by the OHR.
The methodology of the OHR explains the significant divergence. The OHR is using Facebook and other social media for gathering raw data. That is, the collection of every individual report by individuals, every newscast about casualties, and so forth. In early 2012 the inaccurate and biased reports of the OHR became increasingly embarrassing for those media which used them. The OHR reportedly divided into two offices, of which one denounced the other for being responsible for the flawed methodology and biased or exaggerated reports. However, after the split neither the one or the other OHR bureau in London has issued any report that indicates that a more reliable methodology has been implemented.
The Manufacturing of False Reports and Manufacturing of Violence.
After the massacre in the Syrian city Al-Houla in late Mai 2012 the BBC released an article in which the massacre was attributed to Syrian military forces. Later that month BBC´s news editor John Williams admitted that the report had been based on what Williams called ”opposition propaganda”. 11
On 28 Mai 2012 the Italian photo-journalist Marco Di Lauro discovered that the BBC had illegally used one of his photos. Di Lauro´s photo showed the civilian casualties after a US bombing raid in Iraq. Without Di Lauro´s permission and consent the BBC used the photo in an article under the headline ”Syria massacre in Houla condemned as outrage grows”. The caption under the disappropriated photo read ” This image – which cannot be independently verified – is believed to show the bodies of children in Houla awaiting burial”. 12
Despite a thorough investigation was initiated by Syrian authorities, and although both the Syrian authorities and many of the Syria based opposition groups stated that the massacre had not been committed by the Syrian military but the Free Syrian Army the BCC and Al-Jazeera, along with others maintained that initial narrative.
According to statements by Syria based opposition groups, and more importantly, according to statements from survivors of the massacre it had been committed by the Free Syrian Army. According to eyewitnesses from Al Houla the victims of the massacre had been almost exclusively families with ties to the Baath Party or other parties who are taking part in the national reform process.
The Assassination of Journalist Maya Naser.
In late September 2012 the 33 year old journalist Maya Naser was shot dead by a sniper. Maya Naser was working as a correspondent for PRESS TV and Al-Alam TV in Damascus.13 The murder took place after Naser took to the scene of two explosions in Damascus. According to reliable reports, the snipers that opened fire on Maya Naser and his colleague had already been in place approximately two hours before the explosions. It is likely that the assassins have used the journalists Twitter feed to ascertain whether he would arrive at the scene.
During the last two weeks of his life, Maya Naser had found evidence that strongly indicated that the Turkish government is releasing prisoners who are sentenced for terrorism charges to fight in the insurgency in Syria. Most likely against being offered to clear their criminal record. Not long after Maya Naser had entered into an ad hoc investigative alliance with the author of this article, leading members of the Workers´ Party – Turkey and a renown international lawyer he was assassinated. Details are published in the article ”Killing of Journalist Maya Naser in Damascus possibly tied to His Investigation into Turkey War Crimes”. 14
Also other journalists who are working in Syria or Turkey are being targeted. A journalist from the Lebanese Al-Jadeed TV who witnessed how a Turkish military officer in Syria distributed weapons to Salafist fighters and FSA units. The Journalist was kidnapped, investigated and threatened before she was released. A video with statements from the Al-Jadeed Station Chief in Beirut and the journalist is published in ”Turkey´s Decision to allow Cross-Border Military Operations violates Constitution, International Law, and endangers National Integrity”. 15
Information Warfare – Absolute Image Control and Modern Warfare.
According to contemporary US-American and NATO military doctrine, absolute image control is an essential element of modern warfare. In early July, simultaneously with the initiation of the FSA`s military campaign for Aleppo and after pressure from the Arab League (AL), Arabsat and Nilesat stopped carrying Syrian Radio and TV channels. Combined with the blocking internet access to the websites of the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) in western and Arab countries the NATO doctrine of absolute image control was being implemented against Syria. 16 The blocking of Syrian Radio and TV channels, combined with the willful manufacturing of false media reports, the silencing of journalists and more violate among other article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 17 and UN General Assembly Resolutions 110, 381 and 819. 18 19 20. Resolutions 110, 381, and 819 are regulating the erection of obstacles to the free exchange of information and ideas as well as propaganda. The resolutions have been adopted in the post World War II period and are especially pertaining warfare. The protests of the Syrian Ambassador at the United Nations have not yielded any result and a critical analysis of the role of the UN will be given later on in the article.
The adverse effect of this manufacturing of consent by highly questionable to right out criminal methods will, unless addressed within the discourse of genuine conflict resolution:
Aggravate the crisis in Syria and obstruct national dialog national reconciliation and the building of a genuine democratic culture, genuine democratic institutions and a genuine political discourse toward reforms.
Aggravate the influx of extremist organizations to Syria, creating grave security challenges not only in Syria but for the region as well as globally.
Preventing populations in western and Arab nations who directly or indirectly support the armed or pro-regime change opposition from making informed decisions within their nation’s political discourse, thus obstructing both the Syrian reform process, reconciliation and Syrian, regional and global conflict resolution.
Preventing members of parliaments from making informed decisions which have a direct impact not only on Syria and the Middle East, but which have potentially dangerous global, geo-politic implications.
Prevent a genuine discourse for conflict resolution at the United Nations General Assembly.
Psychologically bias honest brokers. The same principles which are active in courts of law, where the accused has been subject to being sentenced by the media are operand within the context of conflict resolution. Even though one has access to all available objective information it becomes impossible to make an unbiased decision.
The Role of the United Nations – The Deadlock of the Security Council over Syria. …
to be continued  (Part 1)(Part3)
Dr. Christof Lehmann
27.10.2012
Dr. Christof Lehmann is a psychologist, independent political adviser and consultant with 30 years experience on the highest levels of international politics, geo-politics, conflict and conflict resolution. He is a lifelong advocate for human rights, peace and international justice. Christof Lehmann is a frequent contributor of articles to print and online media and is the owner of the blogue nsnbc – no spin news. He can be contacted at [email protected] .
PART 1
Notes for part 2:
11) Chris Marsden (2012), BBC Word News Editor: Houla Massacre Coverage based on Opposition Propaganda. World Socialist Website, 15 June 2012, accessed on nsnbc 26.10.2012 at http://nsnbc.wordpress.com/2012/06/16/bbc-world-news-editor-houla-massacre-coverage-based-on-opposition-propaganda/
12) Marco Di Lauro (2012) BBC Illegally Uses Image of Iraqi Victims: The US/NATO, UN Demonization Propaganda Against Syrian Government Further Intensifies. 28.05.2012, nsnbc, accessed on nsnbc on 26.10.2012 at http://nsnbc.wordpress.com/2012/05/28/bbc-illegally-uses-image-of-iraqi-victims-the-usnato-un-demonization-propaganda-against-syrian-government-further-intensify/
13) Finian Cunningham (2012) Press TV correspondent killed for exposing truth. PRESS TV, 28.09.2012, accessed on nsnbc on 26.10.2012 at http://nsnbc.wordpress.com/2012/09/29/press-tv-correspondent-killed-for-exposing-truth/
14) Christof Lehmann (2012) Killing of Journalist Maya Naser in Damascus possibly tied to His Investigation into Turkey War Crimes. Nsnbc 27.09.2012, accessed on nsnbc on 26.10.2012 at http://nsnbc.wordpress.com/2012/09/27/killing-of-journalist-maya-naser-in-damascus-possibly-tied-to-his-investigation-into-turkey-war-crimes/
15) Christof Lehmann (2012) Turkey´s Decision to allow Cross-Border Military Operations violates Constitution, International Law, and endangers National Integrity. Nsnbc, 07.10.2012, accessed on nsnbc on 26.10.2012 at http://nsnbc.wordpress.com/2012/10/07/turkey%C2%B4s-decision-to-allow-cross-border-military-operations-violates-constitution-international-law-and-endangers-national-integrity/
16) Christof Lehmann (2012) Preparation of Absolute Image Control in War on Syria. Nsnbc 03.06.2012, accessed on nsnbc on 26.10.2012 at http://nsnbc.wordpress.com/2012/06/03/preparation-of-absolute-image-control-in-war-on-syria/.
17) UN Documents. Universal declaration of Human Rights. Accessed on 26.10.2012 at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/
18) UN Documents. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 110, accessed on 26.10.2012 at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/038/17/IMG/NR003817.pdf?OpenElement
19) UN Documents. United Nations general Assembly Resolution 381, accessed on 26.10.2012 at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/059/79/IMG/NR005979.pdf?OpenElement
20) UN Documents. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 819. accessed on 26.10.2012 at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/095/54/IMG/NR009554.pdf?OpenElement
21)

The Dynamics of the Crisis in Syria. Conflict Versus Conflict Resolution. (Part 3)
–Dr. Christof Lehmann. – After 19 months of violent conflict in Syria a feasible solution seems farther removed than ever. The influx of fundamentalist Salafist or Wahabist fighters which have been streaming to Syria since the failure of two major Free Syrian Army assaults on Aleppo in June and July 2012 made it increasingly difficult to build a coherent and credible Syrian political and military opposition among the proponents of regime-change. The international anti Syrian alliance has difficulties in identifying a political or military opposition that could be used as an argument for regime change. The Turkish-Syrian conflict risks to spiral out of control with potentially catastrophic consequences for Syria, Turkey, Lebanon and the region. After the violence has begun spreading into Turkey and Lebanon, increasing the risk of a regional war with potentially global bearing, the containment of the crisis is becoming increasingly difficult. The international community is as divided as the Syrian opposition. The pressure is on all sides to resolve the crisis. Opinions about how to solve the crisis differ widely. The article offers the necessary analysis, suggests possible solutions and the potential consequences of a protracted and widening conflict.
Appraisal of the Supranational, International, Regional, National, and Other Key Stakeholders. The Interplay between Stakeholders Convergent and Divergent Political, Geo-Politic, Security and Energy Needs as Key to the Crisis.
The United Nations.
The role of the United Nations in the Syrian Crisis is as complex as it is problematic. The United Nations engagement in Syria is reflecting the deep-rooted structural, systemic and judicial crisis which is increasingly diminishing its credibility and potential for playing a constructive role in resolving situations like the crisis in Syria. The crisis of the United Nations is predominantly elicited by the situation at the UN Security Council, the UN Human Rights Council´s Independent Commission of Inquiry, the Joint UN – Arab League Peace Mission, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the implicit interplay between these UN Agencies.
The UN – Security Council (UNSC).
The UNSC has been widely criticized for the erosion of national sovereignty and the abuse of the UNSC as instrument for lending apparent legitimacy to aggressions that serve permanent members geo-politic interest. The institutionalization of humanitarian interventions and the principle of a responsibility to protect since the 1980s have aggravated this problem. According to an article by Black, Fetzer, Mezyaev and Lehmann (21) these modern constructs are legally questionable, highly problematic and have severely aggravated the systemic, structural and legal problems related to the UNSC.
The most recent example of a successful abuse of the erosion of national sovereignty under the pretense of a manufactured responsibility to protect is NATO´s abuse of UNSC Resolution 1973 (2011) on Libya. Russian, Chinese, Syrian, Iranian and other nations concerns with respect to violations of national sovereignty have been further aggravated because the US Permanent Representative to NATO, Ivo H. Daalder, and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and Commander of the US European Command, James G. Stavridis have praised NATO´s intervention in Libya under Resolution 1973 as ”teachable moment… and a model for future interventions”. An appraisal of the implications of this interpretation was published in an article by Lehmann. (22)
According to the UN Charter a UNSC resolution requires the concurring votes of all permanent members. Russia and China abstained from Resolution 1973 taking a calculated risk. Even though the UN Charter requires the concurrent votes of all members it has become practice since UNSC Resolution 4 (1946) on Spain that an abstention can be interpreted as not preventing the implementation of a resolution by its proponents. It was however, also commonly agreed practice that an abstention was interpreted as a signal by those who abstained, that those UNSC members who then would begin implementing the not formally adopted resolution should not exceed any of the provisions, powers or limitations that have been specified in it.
The USA, France and the UK abused not only the UN Charter but also this informally social contract when the USA and its allies abused Resolution 1973 to wage a de facto war of aggression against Libya, to bring about regime change with the aid of special forces and mercenaries, and to assassinate Muammar Ghadafi.
A repetition of this abuse, directed against Syria, has so far been successfully prevented by Russia and China who since have consequently vetoed resolutions on Syria which would violate international law. In response, the United States has recently vetoed a Russian sponsored Resolution on Syria which was drafted and proposed to counter the illegal provision of weapons and funds to the foreign backed insurgents, as a means for reestablishing security, stability and a climate in which negotiations and reforms can take place.
With the UN Security Council literally frozen it is unlikely that it can play a constructive role in resolving the crisis unless a settlement between the two primary blocks of stakeholders can be reached. As it will be detailed below, one of the major preconditions for a settlement would be negotiations with regard to a lack of convergence in the energy-security and geo-politic needs of Qatar, the E.U. Turkey, Bahrain, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the USA on one hand, and Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Russia and to a lesser degree China on the other.
Until such negotiations are beginning to be successfully implemented on all levels it is likely that the UNSC will remain unable to contribute to resolving the crisis in Syria.
The UN Human Rights Council´s International Independent Commission of Inquiry.
On 16. August 2012 the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria (CoI) of the United Nations Human Rights Council issued its first report on the human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. 23
The report has been widely criticized, but serious concerns about the objectivity of the commission were voiced before it even began its inquiry. The CoI has violated several basic principles from its inception. The the appointment of commissioners lacked transparency. The UNHRC failed to involve representatives from the major belligerent factions and to agree on expert commissioners whose objectivity, neutrality and integrity was beyond a reasonable doubt.
The appointment of Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro as chair and the appointment of Karen Koning AbuZayd who together issued the 16. August report (ibid.), is highly problematic, symptomatic for the serious systemic and structural problems at the United Nations and in effect counterproductive.
Before being appointed as chair of the CoI in 2011 Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro served as United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. 25 The fact that it has been documented that U.N. Agencies have been playing and continue to play an active role in the manufacturing and aggravation of the violence in Myanmar´s Rakhine State should have led to the disqualification of Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro. Details about the involvement of U.N. Agencies in the manufacturing of the violence in Myanmar, including details about the arrest and conviction of employees of the WFP and the UNHCR in Myanmar Courts in 2012 have been documented in two articles by Lehmann which were published in 2012. 26 – 27
Karen Koning AbuZayd is serving at the Board of Directors of the United States based Middle East Policy Council which advises US administrations on Middle East Policy. 28 The involvement of the USA in politically and materially supporting both the pro regime change political opposition and the armed insurgency and the fact that the Middle East Policy Council has a strong pro US American bias suggests that the appointment of Karen Koning AbuZayd is counterproductive to unbiased reporting on the human rights situation in Syria.
The recent discussions about the appointment of the former chief prosecutor at the International Criminal Court in The Haag, Carla Del Ponte, as additional member of the CoI is by many considered as the last straw that is breaking the proverbial camel´s back.
Even though Carla Del Ponte has written a book in which she has distanced herself from the ICC and criticizes the International Criminal Court, her previous involvement in selective prosecution at the ICC and other violations of international law to which she admits, is by many perceived as sufficient to disqualify her.
Many international analysts, including international lawyer Christopher Black who has first hand experience with Del Ponte from his work on the defense of the former President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic at the ICC,consider Del Ponte as a western intelligence asset. With appointees as Pinheiro, AbuZayd and Del Ponte one cannot seriously expect an unbiased investigation into the human rights situation in Syria.
The CoI report from 16. August 2012 has been subject to serious critique. Marinella Correggia, a prominent member of the Italian No-War-Network-Roma, issued a detailed analysis. The main points of critique of Marinella Correggia´s analysis are that the commission uses a simplistic narrative and that it makes the unsubstantiated claim that the Syrian government has authorized the Shabibha, that is volunteer forces who defendSyria alongside the regular military, to commit war crimes and human rights abuses.
According to Correggia´s analysis the report also lacks credibility because the investigators did not obtain the same relatively free access to the country that the U.N. Observer Mission had enjoyed before them. She continues by emphasizing that the commission itself has stated that a lack of free access has significantly hindered the commission´s ability to fulfill its mandate.
Another serious reason for concern, so Correggia, is the methodology that has been used by the commission, stating that widely distributed and randomly chosen victims and eyewitnesses could not be interviewed in person. Correggia points out that especially access to victims of opposition violence was limited, and that interviews of victims who belong to the Syrian military or the Syrian government are virtually non-existent.
Another serious concern about the validity of the report and the commissions work is, so Correggia, that the commission uses data from NGO´s such as the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, which is using a suspect methodology and which is highly biased, while the commission has failed to cooperate with Syrian NGO´s such as the Catholic media center Vox Clamantis which could have furnished witnesses and victims of violence to be interviewed by the commission even by phone.
Even U.N. Observers, so Correggia are rarely quoted by the report. A detailed article about the Italian Anti war Movement and Marinella Correggia´s appraisal of the CoI and its report was published on nsnbc. 29 The complete analysis is published in Italian Language at the website of the Anti-War-Movement-Roma. 30
There is a strong correlation between the significant influx of foreign backed Salafist and Wahabist insurgents in Syria since late July 2012 and a significant increase in the most serious human rights violations and war crimes. Summary executions of Syrian military personnel and civilians who are under suspicion of objecting against the creation of a Salafist – WahabistSyrian State have become almost daily occurrences. Kidnappings, torture, sexual violence and systematic abuse of womens´rights and other serious crimes have become epidemic.
The CoI reflects serious problems at the very foundation of the UN Human Rights Council and the United Nations as a whole. In its present form the CoI cannot fulfill the role which it could and should fulfill to prevent and to document human rights violations. It is unlikely that any reform process at the UN as a whole would manifest in time to play a significant role with regard to the crisis in Syria and human rights. There is however, an urgent need for effective change with regard to the composition and the role of the CoI.
The most effective way of implementing an immediate reform would be a meeting between the Human Rights Council and liaisons of the government de jure of Syria, those parties who are taking part in a constructive nonviolent reform process in Syria and those international stakeholders who reject the illegal support of militant organizations who are active in Syria. It is these stakeholders and the Human Rights Council who could unanimously appoint the commissioners.
To further safeguard objectivity the chairman and other members of the commission could be chosen among experts from nations who have no stake in the crisis, and with all parties being able to veto the appointment of commissioners whose objectivity is questionable.
The U.N. Observer Mission.
On 21 April 2012 the U.N. Security Council adopted UNSC Resolution 2043 (2012) and established the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) 31 The UNSMIS was initially established for a 90-day period, to monitor the cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and to monitor and support the full implementation of the Six Point Plan of the Joint United Nations – Arab League Envoy Kofi Annan. 32
The UNSMIS failed when the Free Syrian Army initiated its two major military campaigns in June and July 2012. As detailed above, the campaigns were initiated with the intent to capture and hold the city of Aleppo as seat for a Transitional Government which then could have emulated the successful strategy used in Libya; that is, a Transitional Government that would have called for a no fly zone or military intervention.
On 20 July the UNSC extended the mandate of the mission for 30 days, stating that a further extension could be possible only in the event that the Secretary General reports and the Security Council confirms the cessation of the use of heavy weapons and a reduction in the level of violence by all sides, to allow the UNSMIS monitors to implement their mandate.
The significant influx of Salafist – Wahabist fighters and the increased financial and military support of Salafist – Wahabist organizations with funds and weapons from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other stakeholders however, effectively made a continuation of the UNSMIS inappropriate and impossible.
The mission ended at midnight on 19 August 2012. Due to its discontinuation the UNSMIS never came to fulfill a significant military or political role. The Syrian government remains relatively stable and enjoys broad public support. It is however, not unthinkable that there may be future discussions about a renewed mission if it comes to a relatively stable ceasefire between the armed insurgency and the Syrian military.
The UNSMIS was commanded by the Norwegian General Mood. It is very likely that neither Russia nor China would agree to a renewed mission under the command of a general from a NATO member state without also discussing mechanisms which can safeguard the neutrality of the mission.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR.
It is estimated that nearly 200.000 Syrians have been displaced by the violence. The majority of the displaced are seeking refuge in refugee camps in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. The largest number of refugees is registered in Turkey. While the UNHCR is making a tremendous effort at supporting them with basic necessities of life it fails to protect the camps and the refugees from being abused as military camps and as potential recruits. According to the Deputy President of the Workers´ Party – Turkey, Bayram Yurtcicek, the Apaydin Camp in Hatay is a camp that has been established to conduct and administrate terrorist and destructive activities in Syria. The Workers Party – Turkey has filed criminal charges against the Turkish government for direct involvement in financing, training, arming and supervising terrorist activities in Syria via refugee camps.33
So far the UNHCR has failed to respond to the abuse of the camps and the situation of the refugees, making the situation of the Syrian refugees in Turkey comparable to those of the Muslim Rohingya in refugee camps in Bangladesh, where the UNHCR remains passive while the military intelligence service of Bangladesh uses the camps to house the Al-Qaeda associated HuJI, and to recruit Rohingya refugees for taking part in the subversion in Myanmar´s Rakhine State. (ibid.)
The UNHCR´s failure to address the problem will potentially prolong the crisis and period of displacement.
Dr. Christof Lehmann
03.11.2012